Prescriptivist statutory interpretation? (Part 2 of Scalia and Garner on Statutory Interpretation)

Posted on July 6, 2012 | 1 comment

[Part 1 here.]

For most people who consult Scalia and Garner’s new book on statutory interpretation (I say “consult” because few people are going to read it straight through), Bryan Garner’s name on the cover will lend additional credibility to the book’s discussion of grammar and linguistic meaning. After all, he’s the Guru of Writing and Language. But to what extent is his background and expertise actually relevant to the process of interpreting a text whose meaning is disputed? My answer to that question is, less than you might think.

Let me start by focusing here on the relevance of Garner’s grammar-related work to the kinds of grammatical issues that come up in interpreting statutes; I’ll save for a later post my examination of his work as a lexicographer and how that relates to resolving disputes over word meaning.

Most of Garner’s work is devoted to giving advice about how to write, and most of it deals with topics such as these, which are irrelevant to statutory interpretation:

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Posted in Bryan Garner, Hume, Language mavens, Law and linguistics, Prescriptivism, Prescriptivist, Statutory interpretation, Strunk & White

“Thank you for that submission.”

Posted on July 4, 2012 | 1 comment

One of the areas where law and linguistics intersect is in the study of the linguistic interaction of participants in court proceedings—an area known as “courtroom discourse.” Publications in this field tend to have titles like Discourse Dynamics in the Courtroom, Exploring Courtroom Discourse: The Language of Power and Control, and Power Relations in Courtroom Discourse.

While I’m a participant in courtroom discourse, this is an area of linguistics that I haven’t focused on, and I don’t know much about it. However, I recently came across some raw data that might be of interest to those in the field. I’m making it available here in the interest of science.

The data in question consists of the transcript from a criminal proceeding in Australia, excerpts from which are set out below. Please note that a certain amount of stage-setting will be necessary, before we get to the relevant discourse segment, but patience will be rewarded.

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Posted in Courtroom discourse, Cursing, Maxim of cooperation: disregard of, Pragmatics

Scalia and Garner on statutory interpretation: Introduction

Posted on June 25, 2012 | 1 comment

A new book on statutory interpretation has just been published; it’s titled Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts and it’s by Supreme Court justice Antonin Scalia and usage guru Bryan Garner, who previously co-authored Making Your Case: The Art of Persuading Judges.

Scalia’s involvement in this new project isn’t surprising; he’s the leading proponent of “textualism” as a philosophy and method of statutory and constitutional interpretation, and he’s published a book on the subject. Garner’s participation, on the other hand, is something of a surprise. His writings had not previously given any indication that he had any special interest in statutory interpretation. Garner is most widely known as the author a usage manual (he’s actually written two: one on general usage and one legal usage). He has also written books of advice about legal writing and frequently lectures on the subject. And he is editor in chief of Black’s Law Dictionary.

It is Garner’s involvement that especially piques my interest. Like me, he is interested in language, and a significant part of the book deals with purely linguistic issues such as syntax and word meaning. But Garner comes at these issues from very different point of view than I do, the main difference being that he is generally hostile to the field of linguistics.

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Posted in Bryan Garner, Canons of interpretation, Language mavens, Scalia, Statutory interpretation

Sherley v. Sebelius: Interpreting the statute’s use of the present tense

Posted on November 8, 2011 | Leave a comment

This, belatedly, is the third installment of my discussion of the court-of-appeals decision in Sherley v. Sebelius, which reversed the lower court’s conclusion that the federal government is forbidden from funding research on human embryonic stem cells. The first two installments are here (part 1) and here (part 2); you should read them first if you haven’t done so already or if they’ve faded from your memory. (As before, I’ll note that I represented the Genetics Policy Institute as an amicus curiae in the case, supporting the government.)

One of the points of disagreement between the majority opinion and the dissent was over how to interpret the Dickey-Wicker Amendment’s use of the present tense (“research in which a human embryo or embryos are destroyed…”). The dispute arises because a line of stem cells derived from a particular embryo can be kept in existence indefinitely and as a result can provide stem cells for research that is performed many years later. For example, under the Bush-administration guidelines, federal funding was available only for research projects that used stem cells that had been derived before August 9, 2001, when the Bush policy was announced. And NIH maintains a registry of stem-cell lines that qualify for use in federally-funded research. There is therefore a good chance that an applicant seeking NIH funds will use stem cells from a preexisting cell line.

The majority rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the government may not fund research using such a preexisting line of stem cells, and in doing so the  Dickey-Wicker Amendment’s use of the present tense played a big part:

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Posted in Cases, Genericity, Law and linguistics, Sherley v. Sebelius, Stem-cell litigation, Verb tenses

Tagged ,

Whoa

Posted on August 10, 2011 | Leave a comment

I’m late in learning about this; it apparently went public  back in May, but doesn’t seem to have attracted much blogospheric notice.

Mark Davis, the proprietor of the Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA) and the Corpus of Historical American English (COHA), has made another corpus available via the same interface as COCA and COHA. This one’s a little bit bigger though.

155 billion words, 62 billion of them the 1980s-2000s.

Billion with a b.  Bill-yun.

Update: Apparently some of the features of the interface aren’t available yet.

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Posted in Uncategorized

Watch this space

Posted on July 20, 2011 | Leave a comment

We seem to be getting higher-than-usual traffic today, which I assume is do the mention in Language Log today of my brief in FCC v. AT&T. So this seems like a good time to say that although I’ve been shamefully delinquent in carrying out my duty as blogger to post new material here (a process technically known as “feeding the motherfucker”), I repent of my slothful ways and hope to start posting again more frequently.

Update: I guess it didn’t quite work out that way.

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Posted in Self-referentiality

Sherley v. Sebelius: What does “research” mean?

Posted on May 6, 2011 | Leave a comment

This is the second installment of my look at the recent court of appeals decision in Sherley v. Sebelius, the litigation over federal funding of research on human embryonic stem cells (hESCs). The first installment, which sets the stage, is here. And before I begin, let me repeat that I represented the Genetics Policy Institute as an amicus curiae in support of the government in the case, and that some of what I say here will be adapted from my brief.

I ended my last post by noting that one of the points of disagreement between the majority and the dissent was about whether the word research could be understood to denote a “discrete project.” The majority concluded that the word as used in the Dickey-Wicker Amendment could in fact be understood in that way—an understanding under which the focus is on the specific work for which funding is sought:

NIH funding decisions are forward-looking, requiring the NIH to “determine  whether what is proposed to be funded meets with its requirements.” Therefore, a grant application to support research that includes the derivation of stem cells would have to be rejected….The definition of research is flexible enough to describe either a discrete project or an extended process, but this flexibility only reinforces our conclusion that the text is ambiguous. [paragraph break deleted]

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Posted in Genericity, Law and linguistics, Sherley v. Sebelius, Statutory interpretation, Stem-cell litigation, Uncategorized

A closer look at Sherley v. Sebelius: Introduction

Posted on May 3, 2011 | 1 comment

The recent decision in Sherley v. Sebelius—the stem-cell case—turns to a great extent on questions of textual interpretation. And the dissent in particular discusses those questions at length, and gets just about everything wrong. This is the first in what will be a series of posts discussing the textual issues and pointing out some of what I consider to be the dissent’s errors.

Two things before we begin. First, a disclosure: I represented the Genetics Policy Institute as one of the amici on the government’s side in this case, and portions of these posts will be adapted from my amicus brief. Second, a point about terminology. Although the Sherley case is often referred to as dealing simply with “stem-cell research,” it actually deals with research involving human embryonic stem-cells (hESCs). There are other types of stem cells for which research funding is not restricted. (For general background on stem cells, you can start here or here.)

Let’s start, naturally, with the statute. The Dickey-Wicker Amendment has appeared as a rider to annual appropriations bills for the Department of Health and Human Services every year since 1995. It provides:

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Posted in Sherley v. Sebelius, Statutory interpretation, Stem-cell litigation

Stem-cell appeal decided: government (and science) wins

Posted on April 29, 2011 | Leave a comment

In Sherley v. Sebelius, the stem-cell case in which I filed a brief, the court of appeals has overturned the injunction against federal funding of research on human embryonic stem cells. The decision is available here.

The decision was 2-1, and both the majority opinion and the dissent deal with a variety of language-related issues.

More later.

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Posted in Sherley v. Sebelius, Stem-cell litigation

A linguist walks into an app store… (part 1)

Posted on April 3, 2011 | 1 comment

You’re no doubt aware by now that Apple and Microsoft have hired linguists as expert witnesses in their battle before the Patent and Trademark Office about whether Apple can trademark the expression App Store. Robert Leonard is testifying (actually, report-ifying) for Apple and Ron Butters is doing the same for Microsoft. Their reports are available here (Leonard) and here (Butters), and the electronic docket for the case, with links to the other filings, is here. (Warning: a few of the links seem to be broken.)

The issue that Leonard and Butters are opining about is whether the expression App Store is a proper name that distinctively identifies the particular location in cyberspace where one goes to get apps for one’s iPhone, as Apple contends, or whether it is a generic term for stores where one gets apps of any kind, as Microsoft argues.

I’m not going to comment here on who I think should win this fight, but I do want to make a few observation about some broader (and narrower) issues, starting with a look at how genericness (a/k/a genericity) is regarded in trademark law on the one hand and in linguistics on the other.

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Posted in Genericity, Genericity, Law and linguistics, Linguists as expert witnesses, Microsoft v. Apple, Semantics, Trademarks