Category Archives: -isms of interpretation

Comprehension, ordinary meaning, and linguistics

In my first language-of-the-law post the other day, I talked about the fact that the words interpret and interpretation are polysemous—they can be used in multiple different ways that are related to one another: they can be used to refer both to the conscious process of deliberation that underlies legal interpretation and to the automatic and effortless cognitive processes that underlie the comprehension of utterances and texts. And I said that although it’s not unusual to use those word in both ways, in the context of discussing legal interpretation the can be to obscure the fact that the processes differ. As a result, I prefer to use interpret and its derivatives only with respect to legal interpretation, and to use the words comprehend and comprehension to refer to the cognitive processes by which utterances and texts are understood.

It occurred to me that this would provide a good lead for me to discuss some of the assumptions that underlie my efforts to apply linguistics to legal interpretation. I’m going to do that now, and I’m going to do it by drawing on (and adapting) something that I wrote as part of a book proposal.

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“Arbitrarily reverse-engineering meaning”

At The Koncise Drafter, Ken Adams discusses the new Scalia/Garner book, looking at it from the point of view whose main interest is in drafting contracts:

My interest is drafting contracts, not interpreting them. But to stay out of trouble when drafting contracts, it helps to have a decent grasp of how judges ascertain the meaning of contract language. So I’m happy to have the book.

He has his doubts about whether textualism is an appropriate stance with respect to interpreting contracts:

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Is intensive textual analysis inherently textualist?

Michael Dorf writes that the opinion in FCC V. AT&T is “a bit too textualist for [his] taste”:

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